### Off

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verb: increase- to make greater. or

#### Reduce excludes removal

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

#### The objects -Financial incentives means loans/grants

**UNCTAD, 4** - UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (“INCENTIVES”

http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20035\_en.pdf

There is no uniform definition of what constitutes an “investment incentive”. (Box I.1. contains a list of commonly used incentives.) The only major international instrument that contains a partial definition is the SCM Agreement (see below). Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI and to benefit more from it:

· financial incentives, such as outright grants and loans at concessionary rates;

· fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and reduced tax rates;

· other incentives, including subsidized infrastructure or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental standards.

#### Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

This is the regulatory part

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p414

N.II. 1938. As used in statute giving towns power to "regulate and restrict" buildings by zoning regulations, "regulation" is synonymous with "restrict" and "restrictions" are embraced in "regulations. Puh.Laws. 1926, c. 41. W A»-y\* r

#### The direct object is energy production

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

####  If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### Off

#### Identity-based struggles can never come to grips with the Real of Capital because today’s global capitalism relentlessly fragments identities to ensure that capital’s homogenizing force will prevail.

Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2000, The Fragile Absolute, p. 11-15

So where are we, today, with regard to ghosts? The first paradox that strikes us, of course, is that this very process of global reflex¬ivization that mercilessly derides and chases the ghosts of the past generates not only its own immediacy but also its own ghosts, its own spectrality. The most famous ghost, which has been roaming around for the last 150 years, was not a ghost of the past, but the spectre of the (revolutionary) future — the spectre, of course, from the first sentence of The Communist Manifesto. The automatic reaction to The Manifesto of today’s enlightened liberal reader is: isn’t the text simply wrong on so many empirical accounts — with regard to its picture of the social situation, as well as the revolutionary perspective it sustains and propagates? Was there ever a political manifesto that was more clearly falsi¬fied by subsequent historical reality? Is not The Manifesto, at its best, the exaggerated extrapolation of certain tendencies dis¬cernible in the nineteenth century? So let us approach The Manifesto from the opposite end: where do we live today, in our global ‘post . . .‘ (postmodern, post-industrial) society? The slogan that is imposing itself more and more is ‘globalization’: the brutal imposition of the unified world market that threatens all local ethnic traditions, including the very form of the nation-state. And in view of this situation, is not the description of the social impact of the bourgeoisie in The Manifesto more relevant than ever? The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolution¬izing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolu¬tionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition in life, and his relations with his kind. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civi¬lized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the prod¬ucts of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness becomes more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.6 Is this not, more than ever, our reality today? Ericsson phones are no longer Swedish, Toyota cars are manufactured 60 per cent in the USA, Hollywood culture pervades the remotest parts of the globe. . . . Furthermore, does not the same go also for all forms of ethnic and sexual identities? Should we not supplement Marx’s description in this sense, adding also that sexual ‘one¬sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible’; that concerning sexual practices also, ‘all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned’, so that capitalism tends to replace standard normative heterosexuality with a prolifera¬tion of unstable shifting identities and/or orientations? From time to time Marx himself underestimates this ability of the capitalist universe to incorporate the transgressive urge that seemed to threaten it; in his analysis of the ongoing American Civil War, for example, he claimed that since the English textile industry, the backbone of the industrial system, could not survive without the supply of cheap cotton from the American South rendered pos¬sible only by slave labour, England would be forced to intervene directly to prevent the abolition of slavery. So yes, this global dynamism described by Marx, which causes all things solid to melt into air, is our reality — on condition that we do not forget to supplement this image from The Manifesto with its inherent dialectical opposite, the ‘spiritualization’ of the very material process of production. While capitalism does suspend the power of the old ghosts of tradition, it generates its own mon¬strous ghosts. That is to say: on the one hand, capitalism entails the radical secularization of social life — it mercilessly tears apart any aura of authentic nobility, sacredness, honour, and so on: It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fer¬vour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved per¬sonal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.7 However, the fundamental lesson of the ‘critique of political econ¬omy’ elaborated by the mature Marx in the years after The Manifesto is that this reduction of all heavenly chimeras to brutal economic reality generates a spectrality of its own. When Marx describes the mad self-enhancing circulation of Capital, whose solipsistic path of self-fecundation reaches its apogee in today’s meta-reflexive speculations on futures, it is far too simplistic to claim that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path regardless of any human or environmental concern is an ideolog¬ical abstraction, and that one should never forget that behind this abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources Capital’s circulation is based, and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this ‘abstraction’ does not exist only in our (financial specula¬tor’s) misperception of social reality; it is ‘real’ in the precise sense of determining the very structure of material social processes: the fate of whole strata of populations, and sometimes of whole coun¬tries, can be decided by the ‘solipsistic’ speculative dance of Capital, which pursues its goal of profitability with a blessed indif¬ference to the way its movement will affect social reality. That is the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, which is much more uncanny than direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions; it is purely ‘objective’, systemic, anonymous.

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action towards capitalism

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

 It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

# Case

#### Foregrounding of whiteness reinforces US exceptionalism, undermining solvency – their localization to intra-debate community issues is an exclamation mark

Carey 2009 (Jane Carey, Postcolonialism Researcher, Monach U, Leigh Boucher, School of Modern History & PLS, Marquarie U, and Katherine Ellinghaus (School of Hist Studies, Monach U), Re-Orienting Whiteness (B) 2009)

 (p3-4) Arneson was not alone, as the flurry of similarly dissatisfied reviews indicated." Although not as scathing, Peter Kolchin, for example, also expressed uneasiness at the "elusive, undefined nature of whiteness," the lack of "historical grounding" of many contemporary studies, and the "over-reliance on whiteness in explaining the American past." 2° In assigning such overarching explanatory power to whiteness, he suggested, the field is prone to overstatement and overgeneralization, coming close to "portraying race as a ubiquitous and unchanging transhistorical force rather than a shifting and contingent 'construction.'" 21 Kolchin also briefly observed that one of the "most striking features" of whiteness studies is the "assumption—sometimes asserted and sometimes unspoken—that the racism they describe is uniquely American and that American whiteness can be understood in isolation." 22 The most influential U.S. scholarship, particularly that by labor historians, locates the creation of white identity entirely within historical circumstances quite specific to the United States, namely black chattel slavery and, later, mass immigration. 23 While this narrow national focus has not emerged as a prominent concern within existing critiques of the field, we argue that it is in fact of central importance. Much historical work on whiteness is even more narrowly positioned. As John Munro has outlined, it largely represents another in the series of U.S. labor history projects that have sought to answer the question Werner Sombart posed in 1906, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?," and is primarily concerned with finding "a usable past upon which an anti-capitalist and antiracist future can be envisioned." 24 This in part explains why it has largely ignored wider scholarship that does not share these, very particular, interests, and why many objections to whiteness studies have simply joined the long history of attempts to assert the primacy of class over race. 25 Despite pretensions to an almost universal applicability, distinct U.S. academic debates, as well as specific political projects and disavowals (particularly of the settler-colonial underpinnings of the United States), silently orient the field. In many ways, debates about whiteness have primarily reflected a turf war over leadership in the field of labor history in the United States. The issues at stake are far too important to allow them to be subsumed within such parochial concerns.

#### Whiteness studies fail – US model focus – they aggravate the problem by trying to sidestep our literature bases

Jane Carey (Postcolonialism Researcher, Monach U), Leigh Boucher (School of Modern History & PLS, Marquarie U), and Katherine Ellinghaus (School of Hist Studies, Monach U), Re-Orienting Whiteness (B) 2009

(p2) This is not to say that this collection is united by an unfaltering commitment to whiteness studies. It is equally shaped by a uneasiness with the field tendencies toward ahistoricity, reification, and universalization; its ill-defined analytic vocabulary; and especially its potential simply to reinscribe white people at the center of historical narratives. And we are acutely aware that, since its emergence, the field has proven "a lightning rod for critics.' I licked, alongside its rapid growth, the apparently deserved death of the field has been simultaneously announced as the latest headstone in a graveyard of academic fads. 7 A key development that argues these dismissive predictions, however, is the degree to which the terms "white" and "whiteness" have already been adopted by historians, particularly those writing about European colonialism. These categories have recently been inserted alongside class, gender, and various "others."' This book functions in some ways simply to highlight the significance of this quite startling analytic uptake. But it also registers a profound discomfort with the ways that whiteness has snuck through the backdoor into the historian's toolkit, often with little definition or explanation. Its meanings are often taken for granted, as if they were self-evident. The nuanced, historically grounded, and theoretically broad-ranging approaches in this collection suggest a number of ways forward for scholars. As Matt Wray has recently observed, "whiteness studies has left childhood and is now enduring adolescence. It's having its identity crisis right on time." 9 The time is ripe for a major reassessment of the field. In approaching this task, we wish to foreground the limitations that have resulted from the U.S.-centered nature of most whiteness scholarship. This is clearly problematic for a field that makes broad, even universal, claims to explaining the operations of "race." Whiteness, obviously, has had far wider geographic purchase. We seek to decenter the United States in the area of whiteness studies, and in some ways to recognize that it was never central to begin with. So too, the isolationist tendencies of U.S. whiteness scholarship have produced its lack of engagement with work on race in other contexts, particularly the analytic frames that have emerged through attempts to theorize European colonialism. We contend that this nationally and theoretically limited approach represents in fact the major weakness of the field." In other words, whiteness needs to be reconciled with the major intellectual currents that have shaped research on race outside the United States.

Wildersons argument denies Black agency and fails to come up with effective solutions

Saër Maty Ba (Professor of Film – University of Portsmouth and Co-Editor – The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration) “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation” September 2011 , Cultural Studies Review, 17(2), , p. 385-387)

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

Social Death is an incomplete and unproductive frame for academic discussion

Daniel E. Rossi-Keen ( Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Stetson University in

DeLand, Florida) Review Essay: The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment (A Philosophical and Rhetorical Inquiry). By Michael J. Hyde. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006; pp.

xviii + 336. $34.95 paper. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Volume 11, Number 4, Winter 2008,

pp. 659-677 (Review) – obtained via Project Muse

Emphasis on philosophy abounds in the first half of the book. This is especially so in Hyde's treatment of the relationship between acknowledgment and the origins of existence (chapter 2), his examination of the reciprocity of acknowledgment and conscience (chapter 3), his consideration of how acknowledgment transforms space and time into common dwelling places (chapter 4), his explanation of the generation of a "home" by way of such rhetorical acts of acknowledgment (chapter 5), and his suggestion that acknowledgment functions as a caress (chapters 6 and 7). Though certainly not lacking [End Page 664] philosophical depth, the remaining chapters of the text are a bit more readily accessible to the nonspecialist. Herein, Hyde explores the relationship between acknowledgment and teaching (chapter 8), social death (chapter 9), and computer mediated culture (chapter 10). The book closes with an examination of the rhetoric surrounding the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (chapter 11), explaining how the rhetor may function in society as a hero. In the process of weaving together such seemingly disparate cases, Hyde gestures toward numerous resources for considering the role of rhetoric in guiding, shaping, and challenging prevailing enactments of public life. In fact, one of the most exciting features of this book is that it lends itself to so many extensions and applications. Within this text exists a philosophy of rhetoric, an ethic of human action, an anthropology, a statement both of humankind's origin and of its telos, a critique of contemporary culture, and much more. For this reason, Hyde's writing defies either simple categorization or casual reading. And this is, I think, precisely the strength and intent of the text. The text itself acts as what Hyde (2001) labels a "rhetorical interruption" (77–78), a call to stop and reckon with the state of the world as we currently perceive it. As such, The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment does not always proceed in traditional ways, and some readers may therefore find themselves wanting more careful treatments of themes raised throughout the text. The rhetorician, for example, may wish for a more focused, traditional, and systematic treatment of the relationship between rhetoric and acknowledgment. The philosopher might hope for a more sustained analysis of Heidegger and Levinas. The scientist may call for further examination of the role of acknowledgment in the origins of existence. The theologian may be somewhat disappointed by Hyde's suggestive employment of religious themes. And the student of public affairs may wish for a more explicit statement of the implications of Hyde's work for communal human existence. In one sense, each of these disciplinarians would be justified in wanting more from Hyde's text, for Hyde admittedly leaves much unsaid and unexplored. In another sense, however, it is precisely this kind of narrowness that The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment sets out to avoid. What Hyde has produced is an interdisciplinary treatment of the role of acknowledgment in varied aspects of human existence, and he justifiably demands that the reader do much of his or her own work in expanding and applying this theoretical construct.

#### Racialized descriptions of society reinscribe same racial binaries- constitutes the subject around race

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

These racial identities define the type of subjects that Visweswaran advocates bringing into view via ‘‘a conception of race which is socially dynamic but historically meaningful,’’ even though their objectification potentially risks contributing, unintentionally, to the current resurgence in sociobiological notions of race. Visweswaran’s approach brings race to the fore of critical analysis, but the problem is that it also risks reproducing racial thinking in much the way ‘‘culture’’ has been accused of perpetuating race. Herbert Lewis highlights the perils in efforts to articulate this broader sensibility concerning race.8 Where Visweswaran strives to reanimate the ‘‘richly connotative 19th century sense of ‘race,’ ’’ with its invocations of ‘‘blood’’ as a form of collectivity that encompasses ‘‘numerous elements that we would today call cultural,’’ Lewis cautions against a ‘‘return to the pre-Boasian conception that combines race, culture, language, nationality and nationality in one neat package’’ (980). And though the equation of racial identity with the forms of persecution and exploitation highlighted by Visweswaran is insightful, Lewis observes that, pursued further, this logic reactivates a concept that ‘‘indissolubly connects groups of people and their appearance with beliefs about their capacity and behavior’’ (ibid.).Given the criteria she lists, Lewis argues, ‘‘it follows presumably that we should recognize as ‘races’ all those who have suffered one or another form of ill-treatment. Certainly Jews would now return to the status of a ‘racial’ group (as the Nazis contended), as do Armenians, Gypsies (Rom), ‘Untouchables’ (Dalits) in India, East Timorese, Muslim and Croats in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia, educated Cambodians in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi’’ (ibid.). Every similarly subjected group would be reinscribed and reidentified with the very terms used initially to distinguish them for exploitation and persecution. Dominguez’s concerns about culture’s propensity for ‘‘perpetuating the very terms—of hierarchies of differential values—that constitute the hegemony’’ seem equally relevant to this attempt to ensconce race at the forefront of critical social analysis. There follow interminable questions of subdividing and distinguishing such races. Visweswaran’s description of the processes that produce ‘‘Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races’’ leads Lewis to ask, ‘‘Are these two different ‘races’ or one? Can rich, powerful, and selfassured Puerto Ricans belong to this ‘race’? Do Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Cubans each get to be their own race, or can they all be in one race with Chicanos and Puerto Ricans because they all speak (or once spoke) Spanish? Can Spanish-speakers from Spain belong, too?’’ (980). The problem with formulating research in terms of race is that it becomes very difficult to proceed without reproducing various racialized logics that promote the notion that groups are essentially differentiated—experientially and in terms of innate capacities and dispositions—by race.9 This is a problem that Gilroy takes as a basis for his critique of ‘‘raciology,’’ which I will examine further below.

#### Totalizing critiques of whiteness commodify races- essentialisms ensure no alt solvency

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

One might be tempted to assume that Gilroy’s stance is largely polemical, but his critique is thoroughgoing, as is his call to reject ‘‘this desire to cling on to ‘race’ and go on stubbornly and unimaginatively seeing the world on the distinctive scales that it has specified.’’ In spite of powerful, novel efforts to fundamentally transform racial analysis—such as the emergence of ‘‘whiteness studies’’ or analyses of the ‘‘new racism’’—Gilroy is emphatic in ‘‘demand[ing] liberation not from white supremacy alone, however urgently that is required, but from all racializing and raciological thought, fromracialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking’’ (40). In contrast to Visweswaran—and, interestingly, voicing concerns over ‘‘cultural politics’’ that resonate with Dominguez’s critique—Gilroy sees a host of problems in ‘‘black political cultures’’ that rely on ‘‘essentialist approaches to building solidarity’’ (38).14 Nor does he share Harrison’s confidence in making racism the centerpiece of critical cultural analysis. Gilroy plainly asserts that ‘‘the starting point of this book is that the era of New Racism is emphatically over’’ (34). A singular focus on racism precludes an attention to ‘‘the appearance of sharp intraracial conflicts’’ and does not effectively address the ‘‘several new forms of determinism abroad’’ (38, 34). We still must be prepared ‘‘to give effective answers to the pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their confluence’’ (41). But the diffuse threats posed by invocations of racially essentialized identities (shimmering in ‘‘the glamour of sameness’’) as the basis for articulating ‘‘black political cultures’’ entails an analytical approach that countervails against positing racism as the singular focus of inquiry and critique.15 From Gilroy’s stance, to articulate a ‘‘postracial humanism’’ we must disable any form of racial vision and ensure that it can never again be reinvested with explanatory power. But what will take its place as a basis for talking about the dynamics of belonging and differentiation that profoundly shape social collectives today? Gilroy tries to make clear that it will not be ‘‘culture,’’ yet this concept infuses his efforts to articulate an alternative conceptual approach. Gilroy conveys many of the same reservations about culture articulated by the anthropologists listed above. Specifically, Gilroy cautions that ‘‘the culturalist approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable consequences of illegitimate attempts to mix and amalgamate primordially incompatible groups’’ (27). In contrast, Gilroy expressly prefers the concept of diaspora as a means to ground a new form of attention to collective identities. ‘‘As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race,’ nation, and bounded culture coded into the body,’’ Gilroy finds that ‘‘diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and historical mechanics of belonging’’ (123). Furthermore, ‘‘by focusing attention equally on the sameness within differentiation and the differentiation within sameness, diaspora disturbs the suggestion that political and cultural identity might be understood via the analogy of indistinguishable peas lodged in the protective pods of closed kinship and subspecies’’ (125). And yet, in a manner similar to Harrison’s prioritizing of racism as a central concern for social inquiry, when it comes to specifying what diaspora entails and how it works, vestiges of culture reemerge as a basis for the coherence of this new conceptual focus. When Gilroy delineates the elements and dimensions of diaspora, culture provides the basic conceptual background and terminology. In characterizing ‘‘the Atlantic diaspora and its successor-cultures,’’ Gilroy sequentially invokes ‘‘black cultural styles’’ and ‘‘postslave cultures’’ that have ‘‘supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular cultures, and styles of dissent far from their place of origin’’ (178). Gilroy explains how the ‘‘cultural expressions’’ of hip-hop and rap, along with other expressive forms of ‘‘black popular culture,’’ are marketed by the ‘‘cultural industries’’ to white consumers who ‘‘currently support this black culture’’ (181). Granted, in these uses of ‘‘culture’’ Gilroy remains critical of ‘‘absolutist definitions of culture’’ and the process of commodification that culture in turn supports. But his move away from race importantly hinges upon some notion of culture. We may be able to do away with race, but seemingly not with culture.

#### Whiteness cant be the root cause- history of other races justifying violence based on racialization

Spickard 2009 Paul Spickard, Graduated Harvard, Ph.D in History from UC Berkeley, professor of history at UC Santa Barbara, review of “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, in American Studies, vol 5 num 1/2, MUSE

For Sexton (as for the Spencers and Gordon) race is about Blackness, in the United States and around the world. That is silly, for there are other racialized relationships. In the U.S., native peoples were racialized by European intruders in all the ways that Africans were, and more: they were nearly extinguished. To take just one example from many around the world, Han Chinese have racialized Tibetans historically in all the ways (including slavery) that Whites have racialized Blacks and Indians in the United States. So there is a problem with Sexton's concept of race as Blackness. There is also a problem with his insistence on monoraciality. For Sexton and the others, one cannot be mixed or multiple; one must choose ever and only to be Black. I don't have a problem with that as a political choice, but to insist that it is the only possibility flies in the face of a great deal of human experience, and it ignores the history of how modern racial ideas emerged. Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment.

#### Your explicit focus black academia flips the poles – if our scholarship is flawed because of its narrow focus then yours is too

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 51-4

Under the Cult of Separatism, expressions of mainstream culture considered “default” by most Americans of all colors are processed by many if not most blacks not as common coin, but as “white.” This alienates may black people from some of the most well-wrought, emotionally stirring art and ideas that humans have produced, miring the race in a parochialism that clips its spiritual wings. On a lunch date with a young black woman some time ago, I happened to be carrying a copy of Jane Eyre. For whatever its worth, at any give time I am likely to be reading Alice Walker or Gloria Naylor as Charlotte Bronte or Henry James; I read Tolstroy not out of a self-hating fascination with white people, but because the man wrote a crackling good and highly affecting story. (Anna Karenina so grabbed me that one day when I was reading it in Washington Square, the woman next to me said, “oh, look, there are Anna and Vronsky over there” and I looked up fully expecting to see them gliding by the skateboarders and drug dealers in their bourgeois finery, so real had they become to me.) However, for my black friend, Jane Eyre was not a book, it was a “white book.” “Oh, I’d never read something like that,” she said, quite casually. She preferred to read only books written by and about her own people. That includes a lot of great literature but the person who can immerse himself in the richness of James Baldwin but never experiences Tolstoy is like someone who thrills to a Haydn string quartet but refuses to hear one not of a Beethoven symphony. This person never tastes the whole meal. Yet as I have already said to often, Life Isn’t Perfect, and in terms of the world in general, none of us ever gets the whole meal. This woman will live a full life despite missing out on “white” novels. But often this perspective ends up selling out black Americans. For example, there is a magnificent complete three-CD recording of the original score of the musical Show Boat. It is marred at the beginning, however, when what is supposed to be a black chorus of stevedores sing stiffly with slightly British accents. This was a last-minute emergency measure. Show Boat was the first American musical to substantially address the tragedy of race relations, and includes a black chorus and a white chorus. Fittingly, a black chorus was hired for the recording, but walked out upon being required to sing the original lyrics of the opening chorus “Niggers all work on the Mississippi.” The recording was made in London, and while using American performers, had recruited a British white chorus. On such short notice, the producers had no choice but to have them step in to sing the black choruses as well. The accent difference is not a serious problem in the passages for the white chorus, but it naturally stands out much more when these Britishers are supposed to be deep Southern blacks. Over the years, the lyric in question has indeed been increasingly watered down for new productions in line with increasing racial sensitivity: “Darkies all work…,” “Colored folks work…,” and finally, “here we all work…” by the 1960s. this made sense, but by 1988, with nigger safely quarantined as one of the most socially inappropriate words in the English language to use in real life, the producers thought that singing the original lyric could be perceived as historical in intent, and furthermore, the original line had a true-to-life power that none of the substitutions have. The “Niggers all work on the Mississippi…” line is sung not by a happy gang of minstrels, but by grim, overworked black laborers bitterly quoting whites’ opinions of them; it is also an accurate depiction of the tendency for blacks to use nigger among themselves. Whether one calls this a therapeutic defusing of an epithet via appropriation, or evidence of underlying self-hatred (it is in truth both), the fact is that this use of nigger is undeniably real. It is difficult to believe that anyone who actually watches a production of Show boat, seeing how openly and sympathetically it treats the black condition, could fail to understand that the blacks singing this opening chorus “Niggers all work on the Mississippi” are eloquently protesting racism, not underlining it. This opening chorus portrays blacks giving vent to their frustration at their victimhood, surely something these protesters would champion. The only possible reasons someone would misunderstand this lyric is, quite simply, not having had occasion to listen to a recording, see a production, or rent a video. One suspects that these singers were only glancingly familiar with Show Boat, out of a sense that it is a “white musical” – “oh, I’d never go see anything like that.” As a result, they pass up an opportunity to lend one of black American cultures most precious legacies, the unique timbre and precision of choral singing, to this monumental recording, instead leaving our ancestors portrayed by British whites unable to render the material in the authentic style. This sense of mainstream culture as alien extends into academia as well. Manning Marable has explicitly urged black scholars to restrict their research to black issues, thereby explicitly deeming intellectual curiosity for its own sake to be inappropriate to black American people. Under this rubric, the black scholar is to study slavery, Africa, and social welfare, but never Russian history, Jane Eyre, or mainstream theater history. Many will see Marable as “concerned,” a “serious brother,” or “cool,” but obviously it is a short step from Marable to “oh, id never read that” and the Show Boat walkout. Separatism also has a tendency to close black people off to foreign cultures other than black ones. I once met an aspiring black linguist who had spent two years in China without learning Chinese beyond what he needed to buy food at the market. Most people who spend two years in a foreign country come back speaking the language, and this is especially true of linguists, for whom the experience often serves as a basis for career’s work. This was the only linguist I have ever met who spent two years abroad without becoming bilingual, and it is not likely to be accidental that he was black. Seperatism has a way of discouraging black Americans from learning foreign languages other than French and Spanish, spoken by many Caribbeans and Africans, and Swahili. In my lifetime, I have known only one black person who studied German (it was a required course), one (a Black Muslim) who took Arabic, and not one who took Russian, Chinese, or Japanese. Certainly there must have been some who studied the latter three (e.g, black political adviser Condoleza Rice speaks Russian). Nevertheless, it is significant that in a thirty-four-year language-centered life, I personally have never met any. What makes black people shy away form these languages – even in elite universities – is a sense that they are not “black” things. This particular branch of Separatist orientation has roots in segregation, of course, and was crystallized in the sixties as Separatism expanded into a general coping strategy. Now, however, this wariness of nonblack culture is too often a barrier sealing the black community off from enriching influences. The linguist wanted to go on to do academic study of the Chinese sound system, but he will never be competitive – almost every other linguist studying Chinese has learned to speak the language.

#### Don’t let them get away with playing the “all your evidence is a product of racism” card – you should hold their arguments to rigorous logical standards and not simply dismiss our evidence as ‘just another link’

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 54-5

As the spawn of Victimology, Separatism shares with its progenitor a tendency to be allowed to trump truth in cases that require choosing between them. In this vein, a considerable amount of black academic work downplays logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present, which is founded not upon intellectual curiosity but upon raising in-group self-esteem. Mother Egypt “Afrocentric History,” for example, is primarily founded upon a fragile assemblage of misreadings of classical texts to construct a scenario under which Ancient Egypt was a “black” civilization (was Anwar Sadat a “brother”?), raped by the Ancient Greeks, who therefore owed all notable in their culture to them. Professional classicists easily point out the errors in these claims, only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists” for having even questioned them, neglecting in the process to provide actual answers. Indeed, to insist upon facts – or apparently, to master the complex classical languages in which the original documents were written – is “inauthentic.” The goal here is not to weigh evidence carefully in order to unearth the truth, but to construct interpretations of evidence that bolster a pre-conceived “truth,” like “creation scientists” whose objectivity is decisively crippled by a fundamental conviction that God must be the driver of the universe. Uninterested in any information inapplicable to the construction of the Afrocentric myth and closed to constructive engagement, these people may be many wonderful things, but one thing they are not is scholars. Yet they are respectfully addressed as “professor” by gullible students, and one eminent black undergraduate profiled in Ebony cited a volume of this kind of history as the most important book she had read that year. Ideally, an afrocentric academia is conceivable in which people simply apply the tools of the mainstream academia to illuminating black concerns. This is the vision most defenses of Afrocentric work are based on. However, in practice, the centrality of victimhood in the black cultural identity subverts this ideal. All too often, black scholarship is devoted not to general scholarly inquiry about black people, but a subset of this: Chronicling black victimhood past and present, and to remedy that victimhood, celebration and legitimization of black people past and present. Because black people are no more perfect than anyone else and life past and present is complex, this abridged conception of academic inquiry inherently conflicts with the commitment to mainstream academia to striving for assessment as unbiased as possible. In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand. The result is a sovereign entity where the outward forms of academia – articles, books, conferences, symposia – are harnessed to a local set of rules: a Separatist conception of academia. In “black” academia, as often as not, comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation, and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than the empirical soundness of ones conclusions. There are certainly quite a few excellent black scholars, but overall, Separatist academic standards are pervasive enough to make black conferences quite often perceptibly less rigorous than mainstream ones. Many mainstream scholars would be, or have been, surprised at the sparseness of serious, constructive debate at may black conferences, unaware that because of the grips of victimology and separatism, this kind of debate would be superfluous to the proceedings, and even unwelcome. After four decades, many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and as such, have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but the very politest and most superficial of criticism. Here is the beginnings of the notions at the center of “Afrocentric History” such as that Cleopatra was “black,” that Aristotle stole books from an Egyptian library that wasn’t even built until twenty-five years after he died, etc. Moderate black academics are more likely to say of the most egregious Afrocentric work that “more work needs to be done” than to actually pin it as nonsense, which makes complete sense when we realize that the fundamental commitment of much black academic work is not assessment of facts and testing of theories, but chronicling victimhood and reinforcing community self-esteem

#### Their cooption arguments are unsupported and nonfalsifiable – don’t buy their rhetorically powerful cards – force them to provide specific applications of their abstract evidence. Allowing them to get away with vague, jargon laden cards about race results in the same poor scholarship they criticize

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 55-8

This problem is by no means limited just to the collection of people committed to “afrocentric history”’ it is seldom far from the surface in any scholarly setting in the realm of “blackademia.” As a conference on black performance in 1999, a black scholar from England argued that whites’ tendency to adopt black American popular cultural forms is evidence not of an identification with black people, nor of a desire for cross-cultural harmony or understanding, but of a desire to eliminate the black presence via co-opting what makes them unique. Interesting idea, but hardly as obvious or incontrovertible as the operations of gravity. Does the white teen who like Snoop Doggy Dogg want to eliminate niggers, or does he simply like the beat and vibrate in tune with the antiestablishment attitude that has enthralled young Westerners since Goethe’s Young Werther? Did whites stir the blues and jazz into their marches and jigs to create rock music because they were racists, or because blues and jazz are among the most sublimely intoxicating aesthetic creations humanity has ever known Here in the Bay Area, I have noticed that white females of ages roughly ten to fourteen are fond of imitating black women’s “sassy” “uh-UHH!...” accompanied by the pushing forward of an admonishing second finger pointing upwards, and waved back and forth in opposition to corresponding “sassy swivel” neck movements (tough to describe on paper – thing of Aretha Franklin in The Blues Brothers). Perhaps I lack some exotic brand of insight, but I simply do not see sublimated hate in these girls – on the contrary, they are expressing a joyous admiration of black women’s trademark strength; it’s the melting pot in all of its glory. Similarly, among the white male high schoolers and undergraduates I see who perform hip-hop, imitating “ghetto” gestures and intonation as closely as they can, what I see is a sincere admiration of a massively compelling art form. A lot of these kids will even say “sometimes I wish I was black” – and I do not think that what they wish is that they could become black while real black people disappeared; what they wish – regardless of the fact that this would of course be more complicated than a fantasy dwells upon – is to join black people. Some might disagree with me, but just as many would not, and the point is that there are obviously issues to be discussed here. Yet the scholar at this conference simply put forth his declaration that this kind of imitation masks racist hatred without a shred of support. To be sure, his point was rendered especially seductive by the densely elegant jargon in which academics in the humanities are trained to couch their thoughts. Furthermore, this was all delivered in a gorgeous Oxonian accent which, in all of its calfskin suave, also betrayed that he is extremely unlikely to have experience nay of the particular slings and arrows of a black American inner-city, or even middle-class, life. In general, there was not a hint of anything but Sir Alec Guinness in his demeanor, and thus his statement cannot be informed by any personal discomfort with seeing “his” culture “co-opted.” Indeed, put aside his references to “mimesis” and “negation,” and all this guy was saying was “the only reason they imitate us is because they hate us.” Preface this statement with “Yo,” and its content remains exactly the same. Yet if “imitation is the sincerest form of flattery” has any value as a general aphorism, his was in essence an extremely underargued thesis. Mainstream conferences are devoted not to tossing out colorful accusations, but to sifting and evaluating the idea proposed by the participants. Yet despite this man’s having presented no evidence or argument whatsoever to support his claim, he was heartily applauded several times, and was one of the hits of the conference – he could barely get out of the auditorium for coffee, so besieged was he by people lauding him for telling it like it is. (No, I was not jealou – I was just attending the conference, not speaking at it!) Because this was a black conference, making an argument was less important than reaffirming common wisdom, and to hear common wisdome dressed up in arcane words and an Alistair Cooke accent is even better, in lending it the air of scholarly authority. The substance of scholarly authority, however, was a distinctly lesser concern. What was significant about this was that for anyone to ask this man to supply evidence for this point would have been as shockingly inappropriate as pullout a tuba and blowing on it. His point was simply assumed to be true, or at least, by the more exploratorily inclined, “a valid point of view.” But what this meant was that this was not a forum devoted to the presenting findings or evaluating conflicting interpretations of data or events – i.e., properly speaking it was not an academic exercise at all. It was a rally, designed to reinforced the emotionally based sentiments the audience and participants came in with. After all, even if the man was right, mainstream academia is not inclined to convene conferences with the purpose of proclaiming what is already known. Political science conferences do not feature various speakers presenting nimble variations upon the point that “war is bad”’ biologists do not convene to urgently remind one another that all forms of life are based on DNA. The Separatist current makes this kind of thing seem natural to conveners of many black conferences, out of a sense that actual academic debate is somehow “besides the point” for Africna Americans since our status as eternal victims make our regularly proclaiming this, as it would be for villagers in Chechnya, a more pressing concern. And make no mistake – the same priorities reign even without plumy accents and Judith Butler jargon. I once attended a conference where a black woman gave a paper taking issue with an article which, by her reading, denied that black female speech had any unique patterns. After criticizing the author, with the unspoken implication that this writer was one ore oppressor trying to deny black people their identity, the professor presented a few features of black female speech. In the question session afterwards, a white woman very politely pointed out that the author of the article in question was quite aware of the uniqueness and richness of black female speech, and that the professor’s interpretation was based on a misreading of the author’s phrasing. Ordinarily in academia, the presenter would defend herself by making specific reference to the article and its argumentation. Here, however, was a conflict between the tenets of mainstream academia and the very different ones in black academia. The professor’s sole answer was, “well, I read it as denying the uniqueness of black female speech, and that was my interpretation.” Period. It did not appear to even occur to her that an actual address of the issue might be germane. Unlike mainstream academics who come to a conference prepared to field criticism during question sessions, she considered herself to have done her job simply by presenting the list of black female speech traits – and at a black conference, she had. Indeed, her presentation was constructed not as a reasoned demonstration but as a backyard “calling-out” of the author in the name of injured pride. She opened by reading a passage form the author’s paper and then repeating it in a challenging intonation of mock disbelief, with friends in the audience assigned to shout back the phrase in the same tone of voice to evoke the black church’s call-and-response tradition; she then did this with two more phrases. This was cute, but couching an academic paper as a prelude to a ghetto catfight renders one’s presentation inherently immune to constructive discussion. To criticize it in any way, even politely, is to question not the lines of argument, but an expression of cultural identity – and thus the person themselves. Indeed, the professor’s set jaw at being questioned made it painfully clear that any further dwelling upon the point would be processed as a slight against her and her race, and the questioner has hip enough to intuit the conflict in traditions here and dutifully sit down.

#### Methodological criticisms of our evidence base on the institutionalized nature of race does not warrant simply ignoring it -

Martyn Hammersley (Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning) 1993, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

Various sorts of criticism have been directed at the validity of Foster's work. Some is substantive in character, in other words it consists of a questioning of his claims on the basis of appeals to what is taken to be well-known from other sources. For example, critics sometimes rely on the findings of other research to throw doubt on the validity of Foster's conclusions. Thus, Connolly comments that the fact that Foster's findings challenge he growing" perceived wisdom" of a number of research and theoretical perspectives developed since the mid 1980s (. . .) raises numerous important issues concerning the study's political, ethical and theoretical orientation and, consequently, the research methods used.6 Accompanying these substantive criticisms, very often, are methodological criticisms: these question the inferences that Foster draws on the basis of his own or others' data. For instance, both Connolly and Gillborn and Drew challenge Foster's claim that there was little evidence of racism on the part of the teachers in the school he studied, on the grounds that he took insufficient account of black students' views.7 They argue that he explains away the unsolicited complaints of teacher racism voiced by three of the students he interviewed by treating these as products of a general anti-school attitude. The critics also argue that the fact that so few of the students reported the existence of teacher racism resulted from the influence on them of Foster's own status as a white middle class male whom they identified with the teachers. Another methodological criticism that has been made of Foster's study is that the school he investigated was atypical and therefore does not constitute a sound basis for generalisation to other schools.8 Interestingly, these methodological criticisms parallel in character, if not in force, those that Foster himself makes of other studies; indeed, of many of the studies on which his critics rely in their substantive criticisms. And he, and others, have responded to the attacks of the critics with further methodological arguments.9 What we have here, then, is a body of substantive and methodological arguments which are interpreted in conflicting ways by Foster and his critics. One response to this situation might be to call for further research designed to resolve the disagreement. I would not want to discourage this, but I doubt whether it would succeed. It seems to me that the roots of the disagreement lie more deeply than these substantive and methodological criticisms themselves. We get an inkling of this from the fact that Foster's critics sometimes combine such criticisms with what I will call meta-methodological arguments. These concerned effects in what they take to be the presuppositions n the basis of which Foster approached his own data and that of others. The clearest published example of such criticism is provided by Connolly. He argues that, as a result of his adoption of a Weberian orientation, Foster was unable to recognise the racism that was taking place 'under his nose' (p. 142) in the school he studied. Connolly sees Foster's work in terms of a deterministic model of research in which the findings are constrained by his starting assumptions, in such a way as to rule out the detection of many forms of racism. Gillborn and Drew hint at the same point, criticizing Foster's definition of racism as too narrow. l l In part, what seems to be implied in these arguments is that the evidence which Foster offers in his study, and his questioning of the findings of other studies, must be rejected because they are incompatible with the widely accepted theory that racism is institutionalized in British society, that it is part of the fundamental structure of that society on this basis his critics argue that while discrimination may not seem to be occurring in some particular setting, once we view this setting in the context of British (or English) society as a whole it will be seen to form part of a larger pattern of racism. So, here Foster's claims are being questioned on the grounds of his presumed commitment to an inadequate methodological framework, one which gives a misleading priority of micro-empirical evidence at the expense of macro-theoretical perspective. This can be summarised as the charged that Foster's work is empiricist1.2 And, of course this argument connects with much discussion of the methodology of qualitative research today, in which the empiricism of quantitative research, and of some qualitative work, is challenged on the basis of alternative epistemological ssumptions.l3 What is being rejected here can be more usefully (because more specifically) referred to as a foundationalist epistemology. This is the notion that research conclusions are founded, in some rigorously determinate fashion, on a body of evidence whose own validity is beyond question (for example, because it consists of reports of intersubjectively observable behaviour). Thus, Troyna criticizes Foster for 'methodological purism', which he interprets as requiring evidence that rules out all possible alternative interpretations.l4 Foundationalism has, of course, been subjected to very damaging criticism in philosophy, as well as in the social sciences, over the past 30 or 40 years, and I think it is clear that it is not defensible. There is no single, agreed alternative to foundationalism, but we can identify three radical alternatives that have become increasingly influential in social research in recent years; and whose influence is detectable in the writings of some of Foster's critics. These alternatives are: relativism, standpoint theory, and instrumentalism. These are not always clearly distinguished, and they are sometimes used in combination. However, I will try to show that none of them is very satisfactory. Applying relativism to the case under discussion, it would be argued that the validity of Foster's appeal to the canons of good research is relative to a particular methodological framework, namely positivism or post-positivism and that other frameworks would produce different conclusions. We may, for instance, decide to treat the claims of some black pupils that they and others have been subjected to racist treatment by teachers as necessarily true in their own terms, as reflecting their experience and the framework of assumptions that constitute it, that framework being incommensurable with the one adopted by Foster. Something like this may underlie Connolly's question: 'how can Foster as a White middle class male construct his own definition of racism to then use to judge the accuracy of Black working class students definitions?"5If treated as valid, this argument has the effect of apparently undercutting Foster's empirical research in the sense that it need no longer be treated by others as representing reality. Yet, at the same time, from this point of view Foster's arguments remain valid in their own terms; in fact, they remain as valid as those of his critics. This seems to lead to a sort of stalemate. And, of course, there is the problem that relativism is self-undermining: if it is true, then in its own terms it can only be true relative to a relativist framework; so that from other points of view it remains false.'6 As a non-relativist, this leaves Foster free to claim quite legitimately( even from the point of view of relativism) that his views represent reality, whereas a relativist critic could not make the same claim for her or his views but must treat them simply as representing a particular framework of beliefs to which he or she happens to be committed. The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black, female and/or working class people) have privileged insight into the nature of society. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed. But in other respects this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women’s emancipation. l9 However, while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology.20

#### Our evidence should be preferred over their propaganda tactics – you should not ignore or reject our evidence because it doesn’t directly address institutionalized racism

Martyn Hammersley (Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning) 1993, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

This is not to say that practitioners, such as 'anti-racist' educators, should simply ignore the findings of research. The point is rather that they should judge those findings in relation to their own practical knowledge and according to what is required to pursue their work well. On this basis it might be quite reasonable for 'anti-racists to continue with their campaign against racism among teachers despite the doubts that Foster has raised; though they would be foolish to completely ignore those doubts. All this said, the criticisms of Foster's work do not seem to derive primarily from such practical judgments about his findings. Many of them seem more motivated by a concern with its possible propaganda consequences: not only can Foster's work not be used to support the 'anti-racist' campaign against teacher racism, it could be used by the other side. Indeed, it seems to be suspected by some of the critics that Foster is working for the opposition. The key question, for some at least, is 'whose side are we on?'.44 I do not doubt that propaganda considerations are necessary ones for practitioners engaged in political activity to take into account. While in an ideal world, perhaps, disputes would be resolved on the basis of discussion in pursuit of the truth, it is clear I think that the world we live in is very far from that ideal. However, great danger arises if propaganda concerns come to outweigh other practical concerns. In these circumstances, practical activity is likely to fail because erroneous assumptions accumulate; and its failure may do widespread damage. It would be a mistake, then, it seems to me, for 'anti-racists to dismiss Foster's work. To the extent that it throws doubt on the accuracy of some of the assumptions on which they operate, they ought to consider its validity seriously and not simply ignore, reject or even try to suppress it.45I t may point to a necessary reconstruction of 'anti-racism' This might be required if it were true that racism on the part of British teachers was not widespread or that it did not play a significant role in the generation of 'racial' inequality. Accepting this would not involve a denial that there may be features of the British education system and society that generate the under achievement of black pupils. Indeed, Foster himself suggests one mechanism for this: the allocation of black pupils to schools that are less effective educationally.46Of course, there still remains the question of what level or sort of evidence should persuade 'anti-racists' that Foster is right. I do not want to speculate about this here, merely to point out that there should be some level of confirming evidence at which 'anti-racists' would accept this argument. And even if Foster does not provide that level of evidence, his work could be accepted by them as making a potential contribution to increasing the effectiveness of their activities.47I n my view these considerations should outweigh any negative propaganda effects that Foster's work is likely to have. After all, racists have seldom found it difficult to invent arguments and evidence to support their position, and have generally shown scant regard for the difference between such inventions and more soundly based scientific conclusions. I want to conclude by going even further than this and suggesting that 'anti-racists' are unwise to reject the conventional model of research in favour of an activist conception. One reason for this is that the propaganda capacity of research is to a large extent parasitic upon the conventional model. Once research becomes seen as geared to the pursuit of particular political goals, with research results being selected, even in part, according to their suitability for propaganda purposes, its propaganda value is gone.

#### The argument that their claims are constructed to protect normative legal that are false – this is a non-falsifiable conspiracy – their paranoid mode of though makes effective politics impossible.

Daniel Farber (PhD University of Michigan) and Suzanna Sherry (JD Constitutional Law Vanderbilt University). Beyond All Reason: A radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 1997. P. 166-7.

Radical multiculturalists tend to take a similar posture with respect to outsiders. Either the criticism is another effort by members of the dominant group to maintain their status and power, or it is pandering by members of the oppressed group to the power structure. Even outsiders who purport to be sympathetic to the radical multiculturalists position may be viewed with suspicion – they may be co-opting the radical potential of the movement. Indeed, once you take the position that truth and merit are masks for the exercise of power, there really isn’t any way to consider an argument expect as an attempted exercise of power. So the natural response is not to ask whether the argument is valid, but instead to look for the right tactical response to the hostile move. In addition, it becomes almost impossible to conceive of friendly criticism; to admit that the critic is honestly motivated by a concern about the truth of your own position would be to concede that “truth” is something other than a mask for power. If truth and merit do not exist, concerns about the truth or merit of work by multiculturalists can only be yet another power play. Moreover, as we have already discussed, radical multiculturalists like paranoids, can explain away any seemingly adverse evidence, because they know in advance that it cannot be valid. The paranoid knows that there is a conspiracy against him, and if there is evidence to the contrary, that only proves the power and deviousness of the conspiracy. Similarly, the radical multiculturalists can always deconstruct any apparently contrary evidence. The research agenda, after all, is not to test whether society is irredeemably racist and sexist but to uncover precisely how society is shaped by racism and sexism. Counter-evidence only increases the challenge. The paranoid mode of thought is a threat to efforts at dialogue between radical multiculturalists and others. Combined with the self-sealing nature of social constructionism and its reliance on stockries of oppression, it makes genuine intellectual engagement with outsiders difficult. Nevertheless, as we discuss in our “Conclusion,” prospects are not utterly hopeless. Something constructive may yet emerge from the clash between the radical multiculturalists and the mainstream.

#### We are rational human subjects - Knowledge is objective – we can use our understanding of our shared reality to make decisions – MAKE THEM PROVE WE ARE WRONG.

Daniel Farber (PhD University of Michigan) and Suzanna Sherry (JD Constitutional Law Vanderbilt University). Beyond All Reason: A radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 1997. P. 27

At least since the Enlightenment, knowledge has been thought of as universally accessible and objective. Something counts as knowledge of because of its pedigree but because of its content. That the Pope or the president or the New York Times says it does not insulate it from challenge. Moreover, you and I can know the same thing. We can convey that knowledge to others, and we can be persuaded through reason to reassess what we know. Some things even count as -common knowledge." Objectivity is a tricky concept. (Ask any philosopher.) In using the term objective knowledge, we have in mind something more modest :han eternal, unchanging truth, or what philosophers sometimes call the God's-eye view of the universe. Knowledge as understood at any riven time is not necessarily the same as ultimate truth. We someimes think we "know" things that seem well-established but turn out not to be true, as when everyone knew that the sun revolved around the earth, or that chocolate caused hyperactivity in children. These things have since been disproved, and we now have knowledge of—or at least a very well-justified belief in—their converses. Knowledge is nevertheless objective in the sense that it reflects something bevond fiat or a parochial viewpoint. We would, for instance, tend to discount an unsupported statement by the chocolate industry denying any relationship between chocolate and hyperactivity. This is because we generally believe that there are independent standards for evaluating claims to knowledge and for mounting challenges to established knowledge. Moreover, these standards are crucial to our common vision of knowledge as both objective and subject to change. What keeps knowledge from being stagnant is its universal vulnerability to challenge. Objectivity is the aspiration to eliminate beliefs based on bias, personal idiosyncracy, fiat, or careless investigation.